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MAJOR COURT DECISIONs, 2007
ACLU V. Gonzales, No. 98-5591, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20008 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 22, 2007)
Issue: (1) Whether the Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231
(2000), ("COPA") is constitutional and (2) whether this court should issue
a permanent injunction against its enforcement due to its alleged constitu-
tional infirmities?
Holding: (1) COPA is unconstitutional because it facially violates the
First and Fifth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs, therefore, (2) a perma-
nent injunction should be issued against the enforcement of COPA.
History: The first attempt by Congress to protect children from harmful
material on the Web was the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47
U.S.C. § 223 (2000) ("CDA"). The CDA was held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest and because less restrictive alternatives were available. See
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004) (discussing Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
The second attempt by Congress "to protect minors from exposure to
sexually explicit materials on the Web deemed harmful to them" was
COPA. COPA was signed into law October 21, 1998 to fix the deficiencies
in the CDA. Within one day of its execution, however, the plaintiffs, a
variety of Web site providers, filed a suit against the Attorney General of
the United States seeking injunctive relief from the enforcement of COPA.
This District Court granted the plaintiffs motion for a temporary restrain-
ing order and eventually granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction on February 1, 1999. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp.2d 473 (E.D.
Pa. 1999). The government appealed this decision but it was affirmed by
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals but on different grounds. ACLU v.
Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court of Appeals found that
the "community standards" language in the statute made it unconstitution-
ally overbroad. Id. at 166. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed but only based on the limited finding that that particular language
was not overbroad. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2002). The
Court remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the District
Court was correct in granting the preliminary injunction. The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the District Court. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir.
2003). The Court of Appeals agreed that the statute was overbroad, did not
serve a compelling interest and was not the least restrictive means avail-
able to serve its purpose. Id. at 266-71. Once again the government sought
review and the Supreme Court granted it. 540 U.S. 944 (2003). Finally on
June 29, 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision to
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grant the preliminary injunction. The Court remanded the case to the Dis-
trict Court for a trial on the merits. Because of the many changes since
Much had changed since the passage of COPA, so the Court directed the
District Court to update the factual record to reflect upon any technological
changes, note possible changes in the legal scope, and to determine the
effectiveness of Internet content filters ("filters"). Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at
671-73.
Discussion: COPA imposes criminal and civil penalties that punish any-
one who knowingly "by means of the World Wide Web, makes any com-
munication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that
includes any material that is harmful to minors." 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1).
COPA only applies to files that are publicly accessible over the Web via
HTTP or a successor protocol, but does not protect harmful material trans-
ferred through email, newsgroups, chat, or peer-to-peer. COPA allows
affirmative defenses against liability for a defendant who in good faith
restricted access to minors. Ways to restrict access to minors include the
requirement of a credit card, adult access code, digital certificate, or any
other reasonable measures that verify age. 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1). Essen-
tially, COPA tries to put sexually explicit images "behind the counter" by
requiring the commercial pornographer to verify age before pornography is
made available.
The plaintiffs in the case represent a wide array of individuals and enti-
ties who post sexual content on their Web sites. The content includes in-
formation about sexual health, safe sex, literary and artistic depictions of
sex, and resources for homosexuals. Many of the Web sites involve inter-
active exchanges through chat rooms, discussion groups, and bulletin
boards; all of which may contain language or images pertaining to sexually
explicit conduct. Of the Web sites included, the majority of them provides
free information and does not currently require a password, log-in, or any
personal identifiable information to access the material.
The thrust of the plaintiffs' claim is that less restrictive means than
COPA are available. Therefore, most of the opinion focused on the avail-
ability, effectiveness, and ease of filters. Filters block categories of mate-
rial on the Internet and can prevent children from seeing unsuitable mate-
rial. Filters are flexible and can be set up according to the age and maturity
of the child, by specific words, Web site addresses, time of day, or day of
the week. Filter software can be purchased or downloaded online however
there are many that are offered for free. Filters can be used to block any
Internet application for HTTP and other Internet applications like email,
chat, peer-to-peer file sharing, and audio and video files. Furthermore, they
block content regardless of the geographic origin of a Web page and apply
to both non-commercial and commercial Web pages. Overall, filters are
difficult for children to circumvent and block about 95% of sexually ex-
plicit material on the Web.
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COPA does not rely on the use of filters; rather it puts the onus on Web
site providers to prevent children from accessing specified material. COPA
provides for an affirmative defense which requires the use of age verifica-
tion technologies. With respect to the ease and availability of age verifica-
tion technologies, the court found that no product accurately verifies age
online. Credit and debit cards are prohibited uses of age verification since
the Internet is faceless, and minors can obtain cards with the consent of
their parents. Data verification services ("DVS") that assess the age of the
individual based on public records like voting, property, and vehicle regis-
tration are easily circumvented by children who know the name, address,
and zip codes of their parents. Not only is age verification an ineffective
way to prevent children from accessing the information, but it hinders
adults from lawfully accessing the same information. For example, DVS is
slow to keep up with name changes, identifying residents outside of the
United States, recent immigrants, and young adults who do not have much
verifiable information. Another problem with DVS is the associated fees.
Any adult who wishes to access a site, whether or not they want to pur-
chase material, will be charged a fee to verify their age. If the Web site
consumes the costs, it will face costs between $14,800,000 to $38,000,000
per year. Additionally, the requirement of personal identification or credit
card information will take the anonymity out of online browsing and will
in effect chill free speech for users who want to browse privately.
In addition to problems with the age verification element provided for in
COPA's affirmative defense section, COPA is problematic in other ways
as well. The court found COPA to be vague because of terms like "com-
mercial purposes," "any person under 17 years of age," and "as a whole"
create uncertainty. Although Congress only intended for COPA to apply to
commercial pornographers, many of the plaintiffs in the case are not com-
mercial pornographers yet still may face prosecution under the statute. The
court found a lack of clarification in the terms will lead to a chilling effect
on free speech because Web providers are wary as to what they are im-
mune from. COPA is overbroad because the terms "communication for
commercial purposes" and "engaged in business" restrict more than the
statute intended. Congress only meant to regulate Web publishers who
seek a profit; however, the broad language allows Web publishers who
receive revenue indirectly through advertising or other means to fear
prosecution as well. The broad definitions also make COPA overinclusive
because its language prohibits more speech than necessary to serve Con-
gress' interest. In addition to regulating more than just commercial pornog-
raphers, the language also regulates speech that is obscene to all minors
instead of just to older minors. Lastly, COPA is underinclusive because it
does not apply extra-territorially to a large portion of harmful material
from overseas; rather COPA only applies to material in the United States
"that is accessible over the Internet using HTTP or a successor protocol."
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However, much of the harmful material that children access comes from
sources like email, chat rooms, and peer-to-peer programs.
Above all, the defendant failed to meet his burden of proof that COPA is
narrowly tailored to a compelling interest and that no less restrictive means
are available. The defendant offered no proof that COPA will be effective,
especially since it will not reach most of the foreign material. The abun-
dance of proof pertaining to filters leads this court to hold that indeed fil-
ters are a less restrictive alternative to COPA. Filters do not impose fines
or prison sentences, they apply to private or public uses, they can be en-
couraged by Congress in schools and training programs, and they cover
formats other than just HTTP. As a result of the aforementioned conclu-
sions of law, the court held that "COPA facially violates the First and Fifth
Amendment rights of the plaintiffs."
Summarized by Megan Green
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp.,
2007 WL 867093 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2007)
Issue: Whether Cablevision is "copying" plaintiffs' copyrighted pro-
gramming or otherwise violating plaintiffs' rights under the Copyright Act
of 1976, as amended, (the "Copyright Act"), 17 U.S.C. § 101, by introduc-
ing a new Remote-Storage DVR System ("RS-DVR") which would permit
Cablevision customers to record programs on central servers at Cablevi-
sion's facilities and play the programs back for viewing at home.
Holding: The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that the operation of the proposed RS-DVR would "copy" plaintiffs'
programming in two ways: (1) Cablevision makes unauthorized copies of
plaintiffs' programming, in violation of plaintiffs right to reproduce their
work; and (2) Cablevision makes unauthorized transmissions of plaintiffs
programming, in violation of plaintiffs exclusive right to publicly perform
their work.
The court found that Cablevision makes multiple unauthorized copies of
programming in two respects: (1) a complete copy of a program selected
for recording is stored indefinitely on the customer's allotted hard drive
space on the Arroyo server, the server that programming is recorded and
stored on for later playback, at Cablevision's facility; and (2) portions of
programming are stored temporarily in buffer memory on Cablevision's
servers.
Based on the court's conclusion that Cablevision, through its operation
of the RS-DVR, would "copy" plaintiffs' programming both in the Arroyo
servers and in buffer memory, in violation of plaintiffs exclusive right of
reproduction under the Copyright Act, summary judgment was granted in
favor of the plaintiffs, and Cablevision is enjoined from copying plaintiffs'
copyrighted works, unless it obtains a license to do so.
Discussion: In these related cases, plaintiffs sued Cablevision and its
parent, CSC Holdings, Inc. ("CSC"), for copyright infringement, seeking a
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declaratory judgment that Cablevision's RS-DVR would violate their
copyrights and an injunction enjoining defendants from rolling out the RS-
DVR without copyright licenses. Defendants counterclaimed for a declara-
tory judgment holding that the RS-DVR would not infringe on plaintiffs'
copyrights, and the parties' cross-motioned for summary judgment.
Under the Copyright Act, a plaintiff must establish (1) ownership of a
valid copyright and (2) unauthorized copying or a violation of one of the
other exclusive rights afforded copyright owners pursuant to the Copyright
Act, to claim a copyright infringement. In this case, it was undisputed that
plaintiffs were the valid owners of the television programming at issue.
Therefore the only issues before the court was whether Cablevision was
"copying" plaintiffs copyrighted programming in violation of the Copy-
right Act by implementing the RS-DVR technology.
A key question in determining the answer to this issue was "who makes
the copies?" Cablevision sees itself as entirely passive in the RS-DVR's
recording process; rather Cablevision contends that it is the customer that
is doing the copying. The court disagreed with this argument for several
reasons. The RS-DVR is a complex system that involves an ongoing rela-
tionship between Cablevision and its customers, payment of additional
monthly fees by the customers to Cablevision would be required, owner-
ship of the equipment remained with Cablevision (opposed to a stand-alone
machine that sits on the top of a television), the use of numerous computers
and other equipment located in Cablevision's private facilities was neces-
sary for the RS-DVR to operate, and ongoing maintenance of the system
required Cablevision personnel.
In addition, the RS-DVR's architecture and delivery method is most syn-
onymous with Video-On-Demand ("VOD"), a service that Cablevision
provides pursuant to licenses negotiated with programming owners. Like
VOD technology, Cablevision decides which programming channels they
want to make available for recording on the RS-DVR system, and the pro-
gramming that they do make available for viewing is stored outside the
customer's home at Cablevision's private facilities.
Thus, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the copying of pro-
gramming to the RS-DVR's Arroyo servers would be done not by the cus-
tomer, but by Cablevision, albeit at the customer's request. This copying
would, as a matter of law, constitute copyright infringement.
The Defendants went on to deny that the portions of programming tem-
porarily stored in buffer memory during the RS-DVR's operation are "cop-
ies" for the purposes of the Copyright Act because the buffer copies are
"not fixed" and are "otherwise de minimis," terms essential to the Copy-
right Act's definition of "copy." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). However, the
Copyright Act provides that a work is "fixed" if it is "sufficiently perma-
nent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated for a period of more than transitory duration." In this case, por-
tions of programming residing in buffer memory are used to make perma-
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nent copies of entire programs on the Arroyo servers. Furthermore, numer-
ous courts have held that the transmission of information through a com-
puter's random access memory, as is the case with the buffering here, cre-
ates a "copy" for purposes of the Copyright Act. As a result, defendants
were found to "copy" plaintiffs' programming in both the Arroyo servers
and in buffer memory.
The final issue was whether or not the proposed RS-DVR would "copy"
plaintiffs' programming when Cablevision makes unauthorized transmis-
sions of plaintiffs programming, in violation of plaintiff's exclusive right
to publicly perform their work. To "perform" a work, as defined by the
Copyright Act, is "to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or
by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the
sounds accompany it audible." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Cablevision again sug-
gested that it was passive in this process, and that it was the customer that
was "doing" the performing. Again, the court rejected this argument for the
same reasons that they rejected the argument that the customer is "doing"
the copying involved in the RS-DVR. The court held that Cablevision ac-
tively participates in the playback process, and that Cablevision would be
engaging in public performance of plaintiff's copyrighted works in operat-
ing its proposed RS-DVR service, thereby infringing upon plaintiffs' ex-
clusive rights under the Copyright Act.
Cablevision is permanently enjoined, in connection with its proposed
RS-DVR system, from (1) copying plaintiffs copyrighted works and (2)
engaging in public performance of plaintiffs' copyrighted works, unless it
obtains licenses to do so.
Summary by Rebecca Magnone
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